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91 
SOLVING A MYSTERY: JUSTICE BRANDEIS’ APPROACH TO 
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
Judge Kermit V. Lipez, United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit 
Presented At The Brandeis Symposium At Touro Law Center 
March 31, 2016 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I decided to write about Justice Brandeis’ approach to judicial 
decision-making to solve a small mystery.  About a year ago, I read 
in Andrew Kaufman’s biography of Justice Cardozo that Justice 
Brandeis stated to one of Cardozo’s law clerks: “The trouble with 
your Judge is that he thinks he has to be one hundred percent right.  
He doesn’t realize that it is enough to be fifty-one percent right.”2  
That comment startled me.  I thought Brandeis’ observation was odd. 
For judges and juries who must decide the facts in ordinary 
civil cases, we accept a preponderance of the evidence standard as a 
pragmatic necessity for the resolution of disputes.  But for appellate 
judges deciding issues of law, there is no such necessity.  We can and 
should impose on ourselves a much higher degree of certainty in our 
decision-making.  Imagine the public outcry if a Supreme Court jus-
tice who cast the deciding vote in a controversial case said she was 
51% confident that she was right.  It would be difficult to justify us-
ing the power of the state to enforce such a tentative decision.  There-
fore, I would never quantify the appellate decision-making process as 
a 51% proposition.  With so much time to study and reflect, with the 
benefit of collegial decision-making, and with the input of able law 
 
 I wish to thank my talented law clerk, Anna Fodor, whose exhaustive research and astute 
editorial suggestions were so helpful to me in the preparation of this lecture. 
1 Louis D. Brandeis: An Interdisciplinary Retrospective, TOURO COLLEGE JACOB D. 
FUCHSBERG LAW CENTER, http://www.tourolaw.edu/JewishLawInstitute/?pageid=998 (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
2 ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 212 (1998). 
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clerks, I would place my certainty closer to 90%.  Sure, the decision-
making process itself often involves fits and starts, changes of direc-
tion, blind alleys, and discarded drafts.  At the moment of decision 
there might still be some doubt.  But 49%?  No way.  I could not is-
sue a decision with such doubt. 
So how could Brandeis make an observation that seems so an-
tithetical to the appellate decision-making process that I have experi-
enced?  To answer that question, I decided to explore some of Justice 
Brandeis’ letters, speeches, essays and opinions, and the views of 
those who worked with and studied him.  I was limited to such 
sources because, so far as I can tell, Justice Brandeis did not keep a 
journal of reflections during his years on the Court, and he did not 
write a memoir.3  Nevertheless, on the basis of the available sources, 
I came to a new understanding of Justice Brandeis’ 51% observation.  
Let me explain the travel that got me there. 
II. THE CONFIDENCE OF LOUIS BRANDEIS 
Self doubt was not an issue for Louis Brandeis; he had the 
confidence of a man who understood his superior gifts early in life.  
At Harvard Law School he set academic records that were unsur-
passed for years.4  As a law student, in a letter to his brother-in-law, 
he criticized harshly a U.S. Supreme Court opinion that he thought 
was wrong on a point of evidence: “I am afraid those Supreme Court 
Judges [sic] will be refused admittance into paradise for the bad law 
they have been promulgating in this life.  Many of them, surely, de-
serve the most dreadful punishment.”5  In 1879, while working in 
Cambridge in a new law partnership with his Harvard Law School 
classmate Samuel Warren, Brandeis wrote to his brother Alfred that 
he had just returned from a Saturday afternoon tea with friends, 
“where we criticized the people and agreed on the stupidity of the 
world.”6 
 
3 See Paul A. Freund, Introduction to ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF 
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS XV (1957). 
4 See Brad Snyder, The Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships 
from Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1149, 1158 n.38 (2010). 
5 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Otto A. Wehle (Nov. 12, 1876), in 1 LETTERS OF LOUIS 
D. BRANDEIS : (1870–1907): URBAN REFORMER, 11–12 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy 
eds., 1971) [hereinafter 1 LETTERS]. 
6 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alfred Brandeis (July 31, 1879), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 5, at 44. 
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Brandeis believed that the projection of confidence was an 
important attribute for a lawyer.7  In 1893, in a long letter to William 
Harrison Dunbar, a young associate in the Warren and Brandeis law 
firm, he wrote that Dunbar should strive to impress clients “with the 
confidence which you yourself feel in your powers.  That confidence 
can never come from books; it is gained by human intercourse.”8 
As a corollary to his confidence, Brandeis was not a worrier.  
In a 1939 conversation with his niece, Fanny, Brandeis observed that 
“for all his philosophy, Justice Holmes worried.”9  Fanny asked him 
if he ever worried.10  Brandeis responded emphatically: “No, never - 
not even when I had trouble with my eyes.  That was when I was 
about nineteen.  The doctor told me I had better give up all idea of the 
law . . . . [B]ut with my temperament I could go on . . .. [T]here was 
never anything organically wrong with my eyes.”11  Fanny pressed 
her inquiry: “If you didn’t worry about yourself, didn’t you worry 
about the world or about people you cared about?”12  Brandeis de-
murred: “I always went on the principle of ‘Do what you can and 
hope for the best’ - I worked on the problem at hand.  All those years 
before I went on the Court, that was my philosophy.”13 
III. BRANDEIS AS A LAWYER 
Before Brandeis joined the Court, he spent approximately for-
ty years in law practice.14  Brandeis had been torn between a career as 
a law professor and a practicing lawyer.15  He acknowledged in an 
1879 letter that “law as a logical science has very great attractions for 
me.”16  But so did “the wrangling of the Bar. . .. It is merely a ques-
 
7 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William Harrison Dunbar (Feb. 2, 1893), in 1 LETTERS, 
supra note 5, at 108. 
8 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William Harrison Dunbar (Feb. 2, 1893), in 1 LETTERS, 
supra note 5 at 108. 
9 Conversation with Louis D. Brandeis about World War II, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS SCHOOL 






14 Louis D. Brandeis Legacy Fund for Social Justice, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.brandeis.edu/legacyfund/bio.html (last visited Oct. 15 2016). 
15 Id. 
16 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Charles Nagel (July 12, 1879), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
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tion of selecting between two good things. . .. I question only which I 
am good for.”17 
In choosing the “wrangling of the Bar” over an academic ca-
reer, Brandeis made a choice of enormous import for his future work 
on the Supreme Court.  In law practice, the logical science of the law 
was of secondary importance.  A lawyer, he explained, must “reason 
from the facts within his grasp.”18  The “accuracy of his facts could 
be a more powerful argument than the logic of his law.”19  He under-
stood “that a case may be won or lost before a legal question is ever 
raised.”20  He considered it “axiomatic that since facts determined 
law, the law had to reflect the realities of contemporary life.”21 
Brandeis was immersed in those realities throughout his ca-
reer as the “people’s lawyer,” a phrase that he used in his famous 
1905 address to the Harvard Ethical Society on “The Opportunity in 
the Law.”22  He believed that “[t]he controlling force is the deep 
knowledge of human necessities,” and that “[n]o hermit can be a 
great lawyer.”23  A lawyer should “[l]ose no opportunity of becoming 
acquainted with men, of learning to feel instinctively their inclina-
tions, of familiarizing . . . [himself] with their personal and business 
habits.”24  He warned that “[a] lawyer who does not know men is 
handicapped.  It is like practicing in a strange city.”25 
By the time Brandeis arrived at the Supreme Court in 1916, 
he had already used his “deep knowledge of human necessities”26 and 
his fondness for facts “stripped for action”27 to win many great legal 
 
note 5, at 39. 
17 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Charles Nagel (July 12, 1879), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 5, at 39. 
18 Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, 39 AM. L. REV. 555, 557 (1905) [here-
inafter Brandeis, Opportunity in the Law]. 
19 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 488 (2009). 
20 Walton H. Hamilton, The Jurist’s Art, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 1073, 1080 (1931). 
21 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 477. 
22 Brandeis, Opportunity in the Law, supra note 18, at 555, 559. 
23 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William Harrison Dunbar (Feb. 2, 1893), in 1 
LETTERS, supra note 5, at 107. 
24 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William Harrison Dunbar (Feb. 2, 1893), in 1 
LETTERS, supra note 5, at 106. 
25 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William Harrison Dunbar (Feb. 2, 1893), in 1 
LETTERS, supra note 5, at 108. 
26 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William Harrison Dunbar (Feb. 2, 1893), in 1 
LETTERS, supra note 5, at 107. 
27 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 1, 1920), in 4 LETTERS OF 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: 1916–1921: MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 514, 515 (Melvin I. Urofsky & Da-
4
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victories.  These victories included his successful challenge to the 
plans of a railway company to run a rail line across the Boston Com-
mon,28 his fights for cheaper consumer rates from gas companies,29 
his peacemaker role in the Garment Workers Union Strike, 30 and his 
storied advocacy in Muller v. Oregon,31  a women’s labor law case in 
which Brandeis introduced social science to the American legal sys-
tem in the “Brandeis Brief.”32 
However, there was some cost for Brandeis in those legal vic-
tories.  During the bitter fight over his nomination by President Wil-
son in 1916 to the Supreme Court, one of the petitions against him 
claimed “that he does not possess the ‘judicial temperament’ that 
would fit him for the duties of . . . [a] Supreme Court judge.”33  That 
charge prompted a strong defense of Brandeis by his close friend, Fe-
lix Frankfurter, in the pages of the New Republic.34  Acknowledging 
that Brandeis was “not amiable in a fight,” Frankfurter justified this 
quality by the high stakes of Brandeis’ battles.35  Frankfurter stated 
that “[t]he law has not been a game to him, the issues he has dealt 
with have been great moral questions.  He has often fought with great 
severity.  He has rarely lost.  His great fights have been undertaken in 
the public interest.”36 
These great fights would now take place in a different forum.  
Given his confidence and his history of success, Brandeis had little 
reason to question the fallibility of his own judgment when he be-
came a member of the Supreme Court. 
IV. THE NATURE OF SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 
The Supreme Court was a good fit for Brandeis.  The Court 
did not enjoy the enhanced power to control its own docket that it has 
 
vid W. Levy eds., 1975) [hereinafter 4 LETTERS]. 
28 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 131-32. 
29 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 140-49. 
30 See UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 244–53. 
31 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
32 Id. at 419. 
33 David W. Levy, The Lawyer as Judge: Brandeis’ View of the Legal Profession, 22 
OKLA. L. REV. 374, 395 (1969). 
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today, as a primarily certiorari court, until 1925.37  Therefore, 
Brandeis had ample opportunities to apply the traditional skills of a 
legal craftsman to correct legal errors by the lower courts.38 
Although consequential, decisions correcting legal errors 
from the lower court did not always engage the creative energies that 
Brandeis applied to the constitutional law cases and their difficult 
generalities—unreasonable searches and seizures, freedom of speech, 
the commerce clause powers, and equal protection of the law.  These 
constitutional law cases posed special challenges for the justices, de-
scribed by Professor Walton Hamilton of Yale Law School in a 1931 
essay on Brandeis’ Supreme Court work: 
[W]here a changing social necessity impinges upon 
the established law, the jurist must possess a double 
competence; he must employ alike legal rule and so-
cial fact, and where they clash, as inevitably they will 
in a developing culture, he must effect the best recon-
ciliation that may lie between them.  The judge must 
become the statesman without ceasing to be the jurist; 
the quality of his art lies in the skill, the intelligence, 
and the sincerity with which he manages to serve two 
masters.39 
Justice Brandeis was blessed with the double competence de-
scribed by Hamilton because he had a vast knowledge of social fact 
from his years of law practice, and was always a brilliant student of 
the legal rules.  Moreover, the constitutional cases played to some of 
his deepest impulses—a distrust of large institutions, governmental or 
private, and a strong belief in the worth of the individual.40  At times, 
as Justice Holmes observed about his colleague, he “was an advocate 
rather than a judge.  He is affected by his interest in a cause.”41 
There seems to be a mix of admiration and unease in Holmes’ 
observation, along with some exaggeration.  Brandeis knew how to 
hold his fire.  In non-constitutional cases, which Brandeis described 
as “ordinary cases,”42 he usually joined his colleagues, even if he dis-
 
37 See UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 584. 
38 See Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917). 
39 Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1077. 
40 Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1084. 
41 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 578. 
42 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 579. 
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agreed with them.  As Brandeis explained: “[T]here is a good deal to 
be said for not having dissents.  You want certainty & definiteness & 
it doesn’t matter terribly how you decide, so long as it is settled.”43 
For constitutional cases, moreover, he believed deeply in 
principles of judicial restraint—refraining from constitutional dicta, 
adhering to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, and refusing to 
hold an act of Congress void unless it clearly exceeded congressional 
powers.44  However, if he felt his colleagues had reached an errant 
constitutional decision, he no longer cared about settled law: 
[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where 
correction through legislative action is practically im-
possible, this court has often overruled its earlier deci-
sions.  The court bows to the lessons of experience 
and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the 
process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical 
sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.45 
Committed to this process of trial and error, Brandeis wrote the great 
dissents that justified Holmes’ observation about him; he was a judge 
deeply “affected by his interest in a cause.”46 
V. BRANDEIS ON THE COURT: HIS DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
There was a curious duality in the perceptions of Brandeis 
during his years on the Court.  Judge Henry Friendly, a former 
Brandeis law clerk, described Brandeis’ “Olympian calm,”47 and Pro-
fessor Hamilton wrote that Brandeis’ “opinions seem to reveal a mind 
rather quickly made up . . . .”48  Yet Brandeis’ outward calm and ease 
of decision-making could not mask his intensity.  As Judge Friendly 
observed: “Everyone who knew Brandeis was struck by his intensity.  
President Roosevelt recognized this when he took to addressing 
Brandeis as ‘Isaiah.’  This quality was manifest in Brandeis’ appear-
 
43 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 579. 
44 See Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 19, 1922), in 5 LETTERS 
OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 1921–1941: ELDER STATESMAN, 63–64 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David 
W. Levy eds., 1978) [hereinafter 5 LETTERS]. 
45 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 383, 406–08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (footnotes omitted). 
46 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 578. 
47 Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Brandeis: The Quest for Reason, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 985, 
993 (1960). 
48 Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1089. 
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ance, in his acts and in his writings.”49 
Perhaps as a way of controlling the intensity, Brandeis fol-
lowed strict routines in his daily life.  He took brisk, lengthy walks 
for exercise.50  He pursued an early to bed, early to rise regimen, of-
ten being in bed by 10 P.M., and working at his desk by 5 A.M.51  He 
believed that “[t]he bow must be strung and unstrung; work must be 
measured not merely by time but also by its intensity; there must be 
time also for the unconscious thinking which comes to the busy man 
in his play.”52  True to this philosophy, Brandeis always ceased work 
for the month of August, explaining: “I soon learned that I could do 
twelve months’ work in eleven months, but not in twelve.”53 
He also followed strict routines in his decision-making, in-
cluding his use of law clerks.  Brandeis had been a law clerk himself 
for Chief Justice Gray of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court.54  Brandeis described Chief Justice Gray’s “mode of work-
ing:” 
He takes out the record & briefs in any case, we read 
them over, talk about the points raised, examine the 
authorities’ arguments—then he makes up his mind if 
he can, marks out the line of argument for his opinion, 
writes it, & then dictates it to me. 
 
But I am treated in every respect as a person of co-
ordinate position.  He asks me what I think of his line 
of argument and I answer candidly.  If I think other 
reasons better, I give them; if I think his language is 
obscure, I tell him so; if I have any doubts I express 
them and he is very fair in acknowledging a correct 
 
49 Friendly, supra note 47, at 985. 
50 See Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark Brandeis (Dec. 1, 1918), in 4 
LETTERS, supra note 27, at 367. 
51 See Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark Brandeis (Dec. 3, 1918), in 4 
LETTERS, supra note 27, at 369; Todd C. Peppers, Isaiah and His Young Disciples: Justice 
Louis Brandeis and His Law Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW 
CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES 67, 75 (Todd C. Peppers & Artemus Ward eds., 2012). 
52 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William Harrison Dunbar (Feb. 2, 1893), in 1 
LETTERS, supra note 5, at 109. 
53 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William Harrison Dunbar (Feb. 2, 1893), in 1 
LETTERS, supra note 5, at 110. 
54 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Charles Nagel (July 12, 1879), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 5, at 38. 
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suggestion or disabusing one of an erroneous idea.55 
Brandeis applied this model to his own work with the gifted 
law clerks who worked for him, “albeit with the law clerk in a more 
junior role.”56  As one law clerk put it: “He expected me to pull no 
punches and read everything with a critical eye.  He didn’t want any 
petitions for rehearing because of any error on his part.  I was not to 
stand in awe of him but was to tell him frankly what I thought.”57 
There was, however, one critical difference between the way 
in which Chief Justice Gray worked with Brandeis and the way in 
which Brandeis worked with his law clerks: Brandeis discussed the 
cases with Chief Justice Gray as part of the Justice’s decision-making 
process.58  By contrast, Dean Acheson, another Brandeis clerk, recalls 
that, 
The Justice wanted no help or suggestions in making 
up his mind . . .. [T]he Justice was inflexible in hold-
ing that the duty of decision must be performed by 
him unaided.  He was equally emphatic in refusing to 
permit what many of the Justices today require, a 
bench memorandum or précis of the case from their 
law clerks . . . . He owed it to counsel . . . to present 
them with a judicial mind unscratched by the scrib-
blings of clerks.59 
There was also a more practical reason for Brandeis’ refusal 
to discuss the cases with law clerks before making a decision.  Ac-
cording to Paul Freund, yet another famous Brandeis law clerk, “he 
would consider it an unnecessary drain on resources.”60  Indeed, 
Brandeis had little patience with endless debating about the merits of 
a case even with colleagues.  He disapproved of the approach of Har-
lan Fiske Stone, the future Chief Justice, when Stone first joined the 
Supreme Court because he thought Stone was too indecisive and too 
inclined to discuss endlessly the pros and cons of each case.61  He 
 
55 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Charles Nagel (July 12, 1879), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 5, at 38. 
56 Peppers, supra note 51, at 72. 
57 Peppers, supra note 51, at 72. 
58 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Charles Nagel (July 12,1879), in 1 LETTERS, supra 
note 5, at 38. 
59 Peppers, supra note 51, at 72-73. 
60 Peppers, supra note 51, at 73. 
61 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 577. 
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even mocked Stone privately: “I think it’s wrong, but. [sic]  I think 
it’s right, but.[sic][He d]oesn’t know and doesn’t take trouble to find 
out.”62 
Once Brandeis made his decision—and Judge Friendly ob-
serves that “on many of the great issues it had been made long before 
the case was argued”63—there remained “the engrossing task of en-
deavoring to persuade his colleagues, or at least four of them.”64  
Brandeis lavished far more time on the drafting of opinions than on 
the decision-making process itself.65  To be sure, there is an indica-
tion in Brandeis’ Supreme Court files that he occasionally changed 
his mind while writing a decision that he had been assigned to 
write.66  But these instances are the exception. 
Brandeis’ drafting process followed an almost unvarying rou-
tine. He “wrote out in longhand on a yellow legal-size pad the nub of 
the case, the question posed, the Court’s decision, and the ra-
tionale.”67  Brandeis would then send the resulting document, which 
was rarely longer “than a page and a half,” to the court printer.68  
When he got it back the next day he would begin to revise and ex-
pand the opinion, starting with the statement of facts, which he al-
ways wrote himself.69  While Brandeis wrote this skeletal draft, he 
was waiting for his law clerk to bring him the results of research that 
Brandeis assigned to him.70  When he got that research, he would in-
sert it into the text of the opinion by cutting up the memo and pasting 
it in the appropriate place.71  Brandeis would go through many drafts 
in this way, sometimes as many as fifteen or twenty.72  For Brandeis, 
the drafting process appeared to be less a test of the correctness of his 
decision than the painstaking effort to explain to his colleagues and 
the world why he was right. 
Brandeis’ research for his opinions involved one revolution-
ary step—he was the first Supreme Court Justice to cite a law review 
 
62 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 577. 
63 Friendly, supra note 47, at 986. 
64 Friendly, supra note 47, at 986. 
65 See BICKEL, supra note 3, at 22. 
66 See BICKEL, supra note 3, at 22. 
67 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 473. 
68 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 473. 
69 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 473. 
70 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 473. 
71 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 474. 
72 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 474. 
10
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article in an opinion.73  Brandeis believed strongly in the importance 
of law journals.  As he explained: “I incline to think that the law 
schools and their journals will ultimately furnish the most effective 
means for recall of erroneous judicial decisions.”74  Brandeis under-
stood that, as a judge, he held the “duty of decision” in each case be-
fore him; thus, he left it to law students and professors, with the bene-
fit of hindsight, to expose the mistakes of the judges.75 To that end, in 
a 1922 letter to then-Professor Felix Frankfurter, Brandeis urged 
Frankfurter to cultivate in law students the virtues of accuracy and 
thoroughness, although he acknowledged that some would have the 
advantage of natural talent.76  As Brandeis put it: “High ability, re-
sourcefulness, imagination, the essentially legal mind, come, like 
kissing, by favor of the gods . . . .”77  The essentially legal mind and 
kissing—only a man of Brandeis’ genius could make that connection. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
So, in conclusion, what do I now make of Justice Brandeis’ 
observation that “the trouble with [Cardozo] is that he thinks he has 
to be one hundred percent right.  He doesn’t realize that it is enough 
to be fifty-one percent right?”78 
I think appellate judges, if asked to consider the issue, would 
calibrate their decision-making certainty at different levels.  I placed 
mine at 90% because, like most judges, I experience the journey to 
certainty as an incremental process beyond the halfway point.  When 
I have only an inclination about an outcome—my 51% point—I must 
do more thinking about the case, more research, more discussion with 
law clerks, and more drafting, before I have enough confidence in my 
inclination to treat it as a decision.  My 90% figure is, in part, a de-
scription of that arduous journey. 
My late colleague Frank Coffin, a gifted jurist by any meas-
ure, described in his book, The Ways of a Judge, the appellate judge’s 
 
73 UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 473. 
74 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Thomas Reed Powell (June 8, 1923), in 5 LETTERS, 
supra note 44, at 97. 
75 Peppers, supra note 51, at 72. 
76 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 3, 1922), in 5 LETTERS, supra 
note 44, at 44. 
77 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 3, 1922), in 5 LETTERS, supra 
note 44, at 44. 
78 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 212. 
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“state of prolonged indecisiveness” in hard cases.79  Judge Coffin 
added this metaphor: “I see the process rather, as a series of shifting 
biases.  It is much like tracing the source of a river, following various 
minor tributaries, which are found to rise in swamps, returning to the 
channel, which narrows as one goes upstream.”80 
I do not think Justice Brandeis would describe his decision-
making process as “a state of prolonged indecisiveness” or “a series 
of shifting biases” as he fought his way upstream through swamps 
and tributaries.  Favored with a rare genius, Brandeis made his deci-
sions quickly, largely through his own counsel, without much fuss.  
For him, that 51% figure did not reflect uncertainty.  Rather, it re-
flected his speedy arrival at a confident judgment.  I am not suggest-
ing, of course, that Brandeis did not work hard.  Nothing could be 
further from the truth.  But he saved his hardest work for explaining 
decisions, not making them. 
That was not true of Justice Cardozo.  Their approach to deci-
sion-making could not have been more different.  Henry Friendly, 
observing both of them, said that Brandeis “knew nothing of what 
Judge Hand, in his moving tribute to Justice Cardozo, has called ‘the 
anguish which had preceded decision.’ ”81  Cardozo arrived at the 
Supreme Court in March 1932.82  Brandeis made his 51% comment 
to the Cardozo law clerk during the 1933-34 term of the Court.83  It 
was offered, according to the law clerk, in “reaction to Cardozo’s 
conscience.”84  By then, Brandeis had observed the anguish which 
preceded Cardozo’s decisions, and the physical toll it may have had 
on Cardozo, who had his first heart attack in 1930, around the age of 
60, and who was in declining health during his six years on the Su-
preme Court.85  Yet, according to one account, Cardozo “was a tire-
less worker exhausting himself by the close of each term.  He used 
 
79 FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL 
APPELLATE BENCH 63 (1980). 
80 COFFIN, supra note 479, at 63. 
81 Friendly, supra note 47, at 986. 
82 Benjamin Cardozo, BIO., http://www.biography.com/people/benjamin-cardozo-
40728#new-york-court-of-appeals (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
83 Ambrose Doskow et al., A Personal View of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo: Recollec-
tions of Four Cardozo Law Clerks, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 5, 16, 18 (1979). 
84 Id. at 18. 
85 ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 139 (2003). 
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work as a way to escape, if not beat, illness.”86 
Observing Cardozo and his declining health, Brandeis may 
have been worried about Cardozo and, with the law clerk as an in-
termediary, delivered a message to Cardozo that he should not drive 
himself so hard.87  Cardozo, hearing the message, responded skepti-
cally: “The trouble with that is when you think you are fifty-one per-
cent right it may really only be forty-nine percent.”88  Hence, for 
Cardozo, the journey from inclination to certainty would remain 
much longer than Brandeis’.  The men were simply different kinds of 
geniuses.  Brandeis’ gifts were not easily transferable.  With his con-
fidence, his refusal to worry, his grounding in the world of affairs, his 
understanding of the “human necessities” of life,89 his insistence on 
time for play, and his adherence to the routines of his decision-
making, he had a remarkable judicial career without the anguish of 
decision-making.  There is no probability in that judgment.  I am 




87 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 212. 
88 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 212. 
89 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William Harrison Dunbar (Feb. 2, 1893), in 1 
LETTERS, supra note 5, at 107. 
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